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How useful is the yield spread as a predictor of growth in Australia? 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper examines the usefulness of the yield spread in forecasting growth in 
the Australia economy since 1969. 
Design/Methodology/approach – This paper applies time series analysis to evaluate the in-
sample and out-of-sample forecasting power of the spread-growth nexus in Australia for the 
period spanning from 1969 to 2014.  
Findings – This paper concludes that the spread serves as a useful predictor of growth in 
output, private dwellings, private fixed capital formation, and inventories in Australia, both 
in-sample and out-of-sample. Its predictive content is not sensitive to the inclusion of 
monetary-policy variables or the switch to the inflation-targeting regime by the Reserve Bank 
of Australia in the early 1990s.   
Original/value – This paper provides compelling evidence to policy makers and market 
participants on the usefulness of the spread in forecasting output growth for up to eight 
quarters ahead. 
Keywords: Interest rates; leading indicators; yield spread; Australia 










The yield spread, or the difference between the yields on long-term securities and those on 
otherwise comparable short-term securities, is frequently regarded by market participants and 
the monetary authority as an important predictor of output growth. According to the 
expectations hypothesis of the term structure, long-term securities generally command higher 
yields than their short-term counterparts because of the term premium associated with 
investors’ preference to hold the latter. As a result, if we plot the yields on otherwise 
comparable securities of different maturities, we expect to observe an upward-sloping yield 
spread curve. However, one of the most enduring stylized facts in macroeconomics is the 
adage that an inversion of the yield curve caused by short-term yields rising fasters than long-
term yields often signals an impending recession.
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 Despite an extensive literature on the predictability of output growth using the spread 
in the United States and Europe, the spread-growth nexus remains a largely underexplored 
issue in Australia. Nascent work in this area has produced mixed findings (Estrella and 
Mishkin, 1997; Stock and Watson, 2003; Schrimpf and Wang, 2010). According to Lowe 
(1992) and Alles (1995), the spread can forecast growth in Australia for up to nine and four 
quarters ahead, respectively. Meanwhile, Fisher and Felminham (1998) find that the real 
spread is useful in predicting real consumption in Australia for up to eight quarters ahead. 
Using the data from 1980 to 2002 and controlling for key determinants of growth, 
Valadkhani (2004) argues that the predictability of growth in Australia can be further 
enhanced by examining the spread within a future horizon of up to 11 quarters ahead. 
However, Benati and Goodhart (2008) point out that the major source of the marginal 
predictive content of the spread has undergone significant structural changes in Australia over 
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time. This is further supported by Poke and Wells (2009), who conclude that the switch to the 
inflation-targeting (IT) regime by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) in 1993 improved the 
predictive power of the spread ever since.      
 Our objective is to provide an extensive re-examination of the significance of the 
spread as a leading indicator in Australia from 1969 to 2014. Our analysis is innovative in the 
following ways. First, we extend the existing literature by not only analyzing the extent to 
which the spread can predict growth in output, but also in key components of gross national 
product (GNP). Next, we assess whether the spread carries predictive content over and above 
contemporaneous measures of monetary policy stance. Third, we evaluate the effect of the 
inflation-targeting (IT) regime, if any, on the spread-growth nexus. Last, but not the least, we 
review the out-of-sample forecast power of the spread as a predictor of economic activity. 
After a reappraisal of the available evidence in this study, we find that the spread remains a 
useful predictor of growth in Australia, particularly during the post-IT regime era.    
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. A literature review is provided in 
the following section. Sections 3 and 4 contains a brief overview of our data and 
methodology, respectively. The main focus is on the assessment of the spread-growth nexus. 
In Section 5 we discuss the results of the baseline model, the role of monetary policy, the 
effect of the IT regime, and the out-of-sample forecasting performance of the spread. Section 
6 concludes.      
2. Literature Review 
The yield spread, or the difference between yields on long-term and short-term securities, is 
regarded by many practitioners as a leading indicator of future economic activity. In part, this 
is because there is ample evidence suggesting that the narrowing of the spread frequently 





spread-growth nexus, there is yet a coherent theory on the underlying transmission 
mechanism, and the positive association between these variables remains a stylized fact in 
many macroeconomic textbooks (Benati and Goodhart, 2008).  
In the empirical literature, the spread is often defined as the long-term government 
security rate, say, the 10-year bond rate, minus the 3-month government bill rate.
2
 In general, 
the yields on long-term securities typically exceed their shorter-term counterparts because it 
is inherently riskier to hold the former. This important feature is often being captured by an 
upward-sloping yield curve, with the yield on the vertical axis and the term-to-maturity on 
the horizontal axis. However, there is no predisposition as to why the yield curve has to 
always slope upwards. It is possible, and indeed, has occurred in the past, that the short rates 
have changed more than the long rates, leading to a flatter, or even an inversion of, the yield 
curve. This change, particularly if unexpected, is perceived by many as an indicator of slower 
growth to come. Therefore, a logical question to ask here is what can explain this apparent 
predictive power of the spread?    
The starting point of most empirical studies of the spread-growth nexus is to estimate 
a univariate model, with the spread being the only independent variable. However, it is a 
well-established fact in the forecasting literature that the past values of the dependent variable 
are often themselves useful predictors (Stock and Watson, 2003). As such, some studies have 
taken this into account by including both the spread and lagged growth to establish the 
bivariate model. In this set up, the spread contains useful information if, and only if, it 
remains statistically significant after the inclusion of lagged growth. Hamilton and Kim (2002, 
p.345) show that “the yield spread provides additional information beyond that contained in 
current and lagged growth rates” in the US. Using the moving-block bootstrap methodology 
                                                 
2
 Other commonly used definitions of the yield spread include: (1) the difference between 10-year government 
bond rate and the overnight cash rate (Stock and Watson, 2003); (2) the difference between 5-year government 
bond rate and the overnight cash rate (Poke and Wells, 2008); and (3) the difference between 2-year, 5-year and 





with lagged growth, Schrimpf and Wang (2010, p.840) conclude that the predictive power of 
the spread “appears to be particularly strong in the cases of Canada and Germany”, but “is 
relatively weak in the UK”. Taken together, this evidence suggests that the inclusion of 
lagged growth reduces possible overestimation of the predictive power of the spread (Stock 
and Watson, 2003).       
One distinct possibility why the spread might carry informational content is that it 
encapsulates market expectations and the stance of monetary policy. Temporary monetary 
tightening, for example, causes short-term nominal interest rates to rise more than long-term 
rates, flattening the slope of the yield curve. In the presence of price rigidities, such a policy 
stance also raises the short-term real interest rate, reducing consumption and investment 
demand, and therefore, output in the immediate future. While this explanation seems 
plausible, it is important to remember that the short-end of the spread is closely related to 
current monetary policy. In other words, the predictive power may not have emanated from 
the slope of the yield curve, but may simply be the result of changes in the short-end of the 
spread.  
In the empirical literature, a common practice to disentangle these two considerations 
is to include both the spread and contemporaneous measure of monetary policy in the same 
model. The intuition is that if the spread contains additional information, then it must remain 
statistically significant after the introduction of monetary-policy instruments. Following this 
line of reasoning, Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991, p.566) include the real federal funds rate as 
the indicator of monetary policy stance and conclude that “the information in the slope of the 
yield curve is mostly about variables other than current monetary policy” in the US. 
Meanwhile, Hamilton and Kim (2002, p.346) extend the monetary-policy instruments to 
include key monetary aggregates and show that “even when all these variables are included 





years ahead” in the US. In Europe and the US, Estrella and Mishkin (1997, p.1394) find that 
the spread “by itself is useful in predicting real economic activity, especially between 4 and 8 
quarters ahead, independently of which measure of activity is used”.  
 The monetary policy explanation seems intuitive given the role of monetary policy as 
a stabilization tool. However, Feroli (2004), Estrella (2005), and Estrella and Trubin (2006), 
among others, argue that the predictive power of the spread crucially depends on the 
credibility of the central bank. Specifically, if the central bank is more responsive to 
deviations of growth from potential than from the inflation target, then the spread can better 
forecast growth in the former. To see this, consider for a moment that there is no inflation 
target. In this scenario, an inflationary shock increases both the short and long rates by the 
same amount, leaving the spread, and therefore, economic activity, unchanged. However, the 
situation turns out quite differently for a temporary adverse real shock. As Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999) point out, if an individual expects a lower income during the recession one 
year in the future, he or she will switch from low-return, short-term securities to high-return, 
long-term securities now in order to safeguard against falling consumption in one year’s time. 
This restructuring of the asset portfolio causes the short rates to temporarily rise faster than 
the long rates, leading to a narrowing of the spread and a reduction in economic activity.
3
 In 
contrast, if the central bank follows an inflation target and defends it at all cost, then either an 
inflationary shock or a real shock would still raise the short rates, but the long rates would 
remain unchanged in both scenarios. In this environment, the positive association between the 
fall in the spread and economic activity is expected to be more pronounced in the former 
because the attempt to smooth consumption in the latter is likely to lessen the impact of the 
real shock (Ellingsen and Söderström, 2001;  Bordo and Haubrich, 2004). As such, the 
                                                 
3
 Estrella et al. (2003) attribute this reduction in the spread to a falling marginal rate of substitution between 
current and future consumption associated with an impending recession. 
 7 
 
stability of the spread-growth nexus crucially depends on the credibility of the central bank; 
the forecasting relationship tends to be stronger when there is low central-bank credibility.  
Subsequent work to the preceding discussion has focused on the stability of the 
spread-growth nexus over time. For example, after comparing the performance of the spread 
against 131 monthly time series and professional forecasts, D'Agostino et al. (2006) conclude 
that the spread has not been a reliable predictor of growth in the US since the mid-1980s. 
This finding is further supported by Estrella et al. (2003, p.640), who find “weak evidence (at 
the 10% level) of a break in 1983 with a break around September 1983 with a one-year 
horizon” in the spread-growth nexus in the US. Meanwhile, Bordo and Haubrich (2004, 2008) 
detect multiple structural breaks in the forecasting relationship between the spread and 
growth in the US during the 1875–1997 period and attribute it to changes in monetary regime. 
Specifically, Giacomini and Rossi (2006) find strong evidence of forecast breakdowns during 
the Burns-Miller and the Volker Fed chairmanship, but the predictive power of the spread 
resurfaced again in the early part of the Greenspan era. However, using the Bayesian time-
varying parameters vector autoregressions with stochastic volatility, Benati and Goodhart 
(2008) cast doubt over these results. As Wheelock and Wohar (2009, p.430) point out, these 
breaks could simply reflect “the increased stability of growth and other macroeconomic 
variables since the mid-1980s (at least until 2007) as a possible reason for the apparent 
change”.  
Recent research has also focused on evidence outside the US and the out-of-sample 
forecast performance. For example, Stock and Watson (2003, p.822) find that while the 
spread “was a useful predictor of growth in the United States and Germany prior to the mid-
1980s”, they notice a substantial reduction in the out-of-sample forecast accuracy for the G–7 
countries over the period 1985–1999. Schrimpf and Wang (2010) also reach a similar 




dynamic characteristics of the spread, De Pace (2013) argues that the forecasting reliability of 
the spread in major European countries and the US returned in 2008. In a recent study, 
Abdymomunov (2013, p.333) suggests that “the dynamic yield curve model produces better 
out-of-sample forecasts of real GDP than those generated by the traditional term spread 
model”.    
In Australia, the evidence on the spread-growth nexus is mixed and remains largely an 
underexplored issue. Early studies by Lowe (1992) and Alles (1995) compare the predictive 
power of various definitions of the spread and suggest that, in general, the spread is able to 
predict growth for up to nine and four quarters ahead, respectively. Similarly, Fisher and 
Felmingham (1998) discover that the spread is useful in predicting consumption growth for 
up to eight quarters ahead. Valadkhani (2004) finds that the predictability of growth can be 
further enhanced by examining the spread within a future horizon up to 11 quarters ahead. 
However, Benati and Goodhart (2008) speculate that the forecasting relationship in Australia 
might have undergone significant changes in recent years. Indeed, after splitting the sample 
period into pre- and post-1982 to coincide with the implementation of the Checklist regime, 
Lowe (1992) and Alles (1995) conclude that the forecasting performance of the spread has 
improved in the later period. Poke and Wells (2009) then examine the effect of inflation 
target and find that the positive association between spread and growth has grown stronger 
since 1990. In terms of the out-of-sample forecasting of the growth in industrial output, Luo 
(2008, p.19) show that the spread is “a good forecasting device for many industries, 
particularly for growth over longer horizons”.        
3. Methodology 
3.1. The baseline model 
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A simple model for evaluating the predictive content of the spread is to consider the 





t h t j
j
t j t hy s y u  

        (1) 
where ty  and    400 ln
h
t h t h ty h y y   denote the level of output at time t and the 
annualized cumulative growth rate h-step ahead, respectively.
4
 ts  is the spread, or the 
difference between the long rate and the short rate, at time t. Since Stock and Watson (2003, 
p.790) suggest that h
t hy   might be “serially correlated, as is typically the case for time series 
variables, its own past values are themselves useful predictors”, we include lagged growth 
rates (from the perspective of h-step ahead), 
t jy  , in equation (1). We then test the null 
hypothesis that 1  has no predictive content for
hy , above and beyond that in lags of y, by 
computing the t-statistic on 1 . However, because the data are overlapping, the error tem 
h
t hu   in equation (1) is serially correlated, we estimate the t-statistic using heteroskedasticity- 
and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors. Finally, we assess the economic 
significance of ts  by inspecting the coefficient of determination, 
2R , and the standard error 
of the regression (SER).
5
  
Information on the predictive power of the spread is crucial to policy makers and 
market participants who rely on it as an indicator for the level of private-sector activities. As 
such, we also examine the predictability of cumulative changes in key components of real 
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gross national product (GNP) for completeness. Specifically, we use the following equation 





t h t j
j
t j t hx s x u  

        (2) 
where tx  is the contemporaneous measure of the components of real GNP, including 
consumption (cons), private dwelling (pd), private gross fixed capital formation (pgfc), 
inventories (inv), and government spending (gs). Notice that we include lagged growth of tx  
in equation (2) to ensure that the spread carries predictive content above and beyond that in 
the past values of tx .    
 In the literature, it is useful to consider the predictive power of the spread on marginal 
growth rate, which is defined as    400 lnht h k t h t h ky k y y     . The purpose of this exercise 
is to “assess how far into the future the predictive power of the yield curve will reach” 
(Schrimpf and Wang, 2010, p.840). For ease of exposition, we set 4k   so that we are, in 
effect, measuring the marginal effect of the spread on year-to-year growth rates.
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3.2. The role of other monetary policy variables  
It is possible that the predictive content of the spread for growth simply reflects the influence 
of monetary policy on interest rates, particularly on the short end. In order to ascertain the 
extent to which the spread contains useful information over and above that provided by other 
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tm  is the contemporaneous measure of monetary policy. In very general terms, the 
predictive power of ts  would still remain after the inclusion of monetary policy variables. 
Similar to Estrella and Mishkin (1997), we begin by looking at the effect of introducing 
short-term interest rates as proxies for the monetary policy stance, including the overnight 
cash rate (cr), the 2-year government bond rate (b2), and the real overnight cash rate (rcr).
7
 
We then consider the one-quarter growth in the monetary base (mb), as well as in the narrow 
(m1) and broad (bm) monetary aggregates. In equation (2), we may conclude that the 
predictive power of the spread “does not seem to be attributable solely or primarily to known 
information about other monetary policy variables” if 
1  is statistically different from zero 
(Estrella and Mishkin, 1997, p. 1394).  
3.3. The effect of the inflation-target regime 
There is ample evidence suggesting that changes of monetary regime may render the spread-
growth nexus unstable over time (Wheelock and Wohar, 2009). According to Macfarlane 
(1997), there were four major changes in Australian monetary policy regime from the mid-
1970s to the early-1990s; namely, the abolishment of the fixed exchange rate regime in the 
early 1970s; the introduction of the monetary targeting regime between 1976 and 1985; the 
adaptation of the Checklist approach until the early 1990s; and the switch to IT regime since 
1993. As discussed in Section 2, the move towards the IT regime is expected to have an 
enduring impact on people’s behaviors, weakening considerably the predictive power of the 
spread in Australia. However, Poke and Wells (2009, p. 127) find that “if attention is focused 
on the post-1990 sample, the spread is always significant and positive”. In light of this strong 
evidence suggesting a time-varying relationship between the spread and growth, we divide 
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the 1969–2014 period into two sub-sample periods; namely, the 1969–1989 period and the 
1990–2014 period. Notice that we have chosen the year 1990 as the break point on two 
grounds. The first is that the RBA decided to release its monetary policy actions immediately 
to the market in January 1990 as a means to increase transparency and credibility, while the 
second is that there was rapid disinflation since 1990, coinciding with the switch to the IT 
regime formally on 14
th
 August 1996 (Poke and Wells, 2009). We then compare and contrast 
the statistical significance of 1  in equation (1) in both sub-sample periods. Intuitively, if 
1 0   in one sub-sample period, but not in the other, we may conclude that the 
announcement of an inflation target has a non-negligible effect on the stability of the 
forecasting relationship. In a passing note, we seek to extend on Poke and Wells (2009) by 
including the post-global financial crisis (GFC) years so that we can establish the effect, if 
any, the GFC may have had on the relationship.     
3.4. Pseudo out-of-sample measures of predictive content  
One key motivation for this study is to evaluate the usefulness of the spread as a predictor for 
growth. Prima facie, one can arrive at the conclusion by observing the in-sample spread 
coefficients under different model specifications. However, such an approach is deemed 
inappropriate here because of strong evidence pointing to a time-varying spread-growth 
nexus. In order to control for this, we obtain pseudo out-of-sample spread coefficients in 
equation (1) via real-time forecasting. Specifically, we set the first 10 years of the post-IT 
period (1996q1–2006q4) as the initialization period, which provides us with a pseudo out-of-
sample forecast window of 2 1 1n T T h    , where 1T  and 2T h  are the first and last dates 
over which the forecast window is computed. We then compute commonly used forecast-
error statistics, including the root mean squared error (RMSE) and the Theil inequality 
coefficient (TIC) for equations (1) and (2). In general, an equation is said to have provided 
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reasonable out-of-sample forecasting power if it possesses a smaller RMSE statistic and/or a 
TIC statistic that is close to zero. 
 However, it is important to note that while both RMSE and TIC are relatively easy to 
obtain, there are no benchmark to compare them against. In order to address this, we use the 
following univariate autoregression as the benchmark model:
8
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where ,
h
i t hz   denotes the growth of the i
th
 dependent variable in equations (1) and (2). 
Following Stock and Watson (2003), we then compute the h-step ahead relative mean 
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where , |ˆ
h
i t h tx   and , |ˆ
h
i t h tz   are, respectively, the pseudo out-of-sample forecasts of the i
th
 
dependent variable and the benchmark model, made using data through time t. Intuitively, 
since RMSFE is the ratio of RMSE from equation (1) or (2) to MSE from equation (4), a less-
than-one RMSFE implies that the former outperforms the latter. In contrast, if RMSFE is 
greater than one, then the benchmark model is said to have outperformed equation (1) or (2). 
If this were the case, the spread should not be used as a predictor of the dependent variable, 
on the basis that it does not possess predictive content over and above the simple univariate 
autoregression.    
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We collected data on up to 14 series from 1959 to 2014. However, some of these series were 
only available for a shorter period. Data were obtained from two main sources; namely, the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Reserve Bank Bulletin. Additional series, 
including the spread and the real overnight cash rate, were constructed from these original 14 
series, bringing the total number of series to 16. Specifically, we define the spread as the 10-
year government bond rate minus the 3-month government bill rate.
9
 Meanwhile, because we 
cannot directly observe the ex-ante real overnight cash rate, we follow Estrella and Mishkin 
(1997) by calculating the ex-post real overnight cash rate as the difference between the 
average nominal overnight cash rate for a given period and the actual inflation rate over the 
same period. Table 1 lists the summary statistics, the source, and the sample period of these 
series.    
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Before proceeding with the empirical tests, the data were subject to the following 
transformations. First, as we are interested in the growth rate of real GDP, key components of 
GNP, and monetary aggregates, we take the natural logarithm and first-difference these 
variables. Second, whenever the data were available on a monthly basis, we aggregate the 
data to quarterly observations by using the average of monthly values. Finally, it is not clear 
whether interest rates should be included in levels or after first differencing, we check the 
stationarity of these series before including them.  
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5. Results  
5.1. The baseline model 
Table 2 presents the results for the baseline model on the predictive power of the spread for 
growth in Australia. There is very consistent evidence that the widening of the spread implies 
higher growth in the future, as previous work for Australia had shown. For example, if the 
current quarter’s spread between the 10-year government bond rate and the 3-month 
government bill rate is 100 basis points or one per cent, the Cumulative Change Panel of the 
fourth row of Table 2 shows that over the course of one full year from current quarter t to 
quarter t + 4, real GDP is predicted to grow by 3.67 per cent 
  3.362% 0.303 1% 3.665%  . The values of the estimated coefficient are generally 
smaller than the corresponding coefficients in Alles (1995) and Valadkhani (2004) because 
these studies did not include lagged growth in the model. Meanwhile, our results differ from 
Poke and Wells (2009) not only in that they define the spread differently to ours, but also 
they examine the forecasting relationship over a shorter time span.    
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 In Table 2, the coefficient of determination, 2R , provides a measure of in-sample 
forecasting accuracy, while the statistical significance of the spread coefficient, 1 , provides 
information on the reliability of the baseline model in predicting the direction of a future 
change in growth. As expected, cumulative change in growth are more predictable than its 
marginal change counterpart. The predictive power for cumulative changes last for about four 
years, while the comparable figure only lasts for up to 6 quarters. Furthermore, the size of 2R  
is consistently higher for the Cumulative Change Panel vis-à-vis the Marginal Change Panel.  
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 Finally, notice that all constant terms 
1  in both panels are positive, indicating that an 
inversion of the spread need not necessarily imply negative future growth. In our previous 
example of cumulative changes from current quarter t to future quarter 4t  , a prediction of a 
negative growth would have only occurred if the spread were less than minus 11.10 per cent 
 3.36% 0.303 11.10%   . From the outset, such yield inversion seems highly unlikely in 
reality. Nevertheless, it provides anecdotal evidence why recession has been a rare event in 
Australia during the post-war era.  
 Table 3 examines the predictability of cumulative changes in major components of 
real GNP; namely, household consumption (cons), private dwellings (pd), private gross fixed 
capital formation (pgfc), inventories (inv), and government spending (gs). The table shows 
that the spread has predictive power for all components, except household consumption and 
government spending. Furthermore, the spread predicts changes in private fixed capital 
formation and inventories better than private dwellings.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 A few points are in order here. First, we find that the coefficients on household 
consumption are, for most forecasting horizons, negative and statistically insignificant. This 
contradicts the Campbell-Cochrane (1999) consumption capital asset pricing model 
(CCAPM), which predicts a positive relationship between future consumption and the spread. 
However, as explained by Fisher and Felmingham (1998), this can be interpreted as anecdotal 
evidence that Australian households do not suffer from money illusion. When the real spread 
is used instead, they find a positive real spread-consumption nexus for up to eight quarters 
ahead. Second, if we focus on 2R , it is clear that the spread is able to predict growth in 
private dwellings, private gross fixed capital, and inventories with good accuracy. In fact, our 
baseline model has the highest forecasting accuracy for changes in inventories, accounting 
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for more than 70 per cent of the variations at quarter 4t  . This is consistent with our current 
understanding that these components are sensitive to movements in interest rates. Finally, we 
find some evidence that the spread-growth nexus in Australia cannot be explained by the 
standard IS-LM model as it would require the spread to be “a better predictor of the most 
exogenous of the components of aggregate demand because it is expected exogenous shows 
to the IS curve that rationalized the story” (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991, p.569). However, 
Table 3 shows that, as the most exogenous component of aggregate demand, future 
government spending is the most unpredictable component. In short, our results suggest that 
the forecasting relationship in Australia remains, by and large, a stylized fact, and hence, 
there is a need to search for the underlying theory.  
5.2. The role of other monetary policy variables  
As discussed in Section 2, there is a view that the predictive content of the spread may simply 
capture the effects of monetary policy on the long and short rates. While such a view is valid, 
we are equally interested in the usefulness of the spread as a simple barometer of future 
growth. Obviously, for this to be the case, the spread coefficient must remain statistically 
significant after the inclusion of monetary policy variables. It is common in the literature to 
consider short-term interest rates and monetary aggregates as proxies of monetary policy 
stance. In the former category, we select the overnight cash rate (cr), the real overnight cash 
rate (rcr), and the 2-year government bond rate (b2), In order to avoid spurious results, we 
check stationarity of these variables before adding them to our baseline model. The results 
from conventional unit root tests suggest that we cannot reject unit roots in these variables, so 
they are included in first differences.
10
  
                                                 
10
 Common unit root tests were considered and all reached the same conclusion that there is unit root in cr, b2, 
and rcr in levels, but is free of unit root in first differences; these tests include the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, 
the Phillips-Perron test, and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test.  
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 [Insert Table 4 Here] 
 The results are presented in Table 4 in four panels. The first restates the baseline 
results in Table 2 for selected even-numbered quarters up to 16 quarters ahead, which is 
where the predictive power was most significant. With the exception of b2, we find that not 
only the spread coefficients are significant, but their magnitude is also consistently larger 
than the baseline model. It is important to note that while the sign of the short-term rates is 
against our a priori expectation, they are, for most part, insignificant. This result runs counter 
to Valadkhani (2004, p.137), who find that “the short end of the yield curve (proxied by the 
cash rate) exerts a negative and significant impact on future output growth when the 
forecasting horizon (k) varies from 2 to 12 quarters”. From the outset, this discrepancy may 
be attributed to different model specifications; Valadkhani (2004) also included the spread in 
Australia’s major trading partners, narrow monetary aggregate M1, the share price index, and 
the composite leading indicator. However, the results in the b2 panel are harder to interpret. 
We suspect that those results were primarily driven by either the shorter sample period 
examined or the fact that the RBA has never formally considered the 2-year bond rate as its 
primary policy instruments. Finally, observe that adding the short-term rates generally 
improves the goodness-of-fit of the model. Taken together, we may conclude that the 
predictive power of the spread remains robust to the inclusion of short-term rates.   
 In addition to the interest rate proxies of monetary policy, monetary aggregates were 
used, as reported in Table 5. Since the monetary base (mb), narrow monetary aggregate (m1), 
and broad monetary aggregate (bm) variables are nonstationarty in levels, they are included as 
the one-quarter growth rate. Once again, we find that, irrespective of the type of monetary 
aggregate included, the spread retains predictive power for up to a minimum of 12 quarters 
ahead. Consistent with Valadkhani (2004), we also observe that the inclusion of m1 
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marginally improves the goodness-of-fit of the model for the forecasting horizon up to four 
quarters ahead.  
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 In summary, the spread by itself is useful in predicting growth, especially between six 
and eight quarters ahead, independent of the measures of contemporaneous monetary policy. 
Furthermore, such predictive power does not seem to be attributable solely or primarily to 
known information about current monetary policy.        
5.3. The effect of the inflation-target regime 
The predictive power of the spread can also be seen by plotting the annualized growth rate 
from quarter t – 4 to quarter t and the spread during quarter t – 4 on the same figure. Figure 1 
shows that, in general, the spread tracks the future realization in growth rather well. In fact, a 
yield inversion often preceded the six episodes of recession prior to the 1990s. However, the 
figure also shows that the association between these two variables is not very precise 
following the switch to the IT regime in 1996. This momentous change could serve as a 
reminder that any historical statistical relationship based on precise economic principles may 
easily disintegrate in the future (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991).       
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 The results on the predictive power of the spread pre- and post-IT regimes are 
presented in Table 6. We find that the spread coefficients are significantly larger and 
statistically different from zero during the post-IT regime period. In addition, the baseline 
model seems to fit this period better than the others. These findings suggest that the spread 
appears to exert greater influence on growth since 1990. This is an important result because it 
rejects the hypothesis that the spread should possess lesser predictive power under an IT 
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regime. So how can we reconcile this apparent inconsistency? Poke and Wells (2009) 
attribute it to falling rationally expected spread as a result of the RBA defending proactively 
the 2–3 per cent inflation target.11 Meanwhile, the forecasting relationship could have been 
enhanced by moderated volatility in the growth rate since 1984 (Smith and Summers, 2002).        
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
5.4. Pseudo out-of-sample measures of predictive content  
Table 7 presents the pseudo out-of-sample forecasting power of the spread. In terms of 
RMSE, the spread is a good predictor of growth in output (y), private dwellings (pd), private 
fixed capital formation (pgfc), and inventories (inv), but not in consumption (cons) and 
government spending (gs). This is in line with the in-sample results in Section 5.1, whereby 
the spread displays good predictive power for interest-sensitive components of GNP. Since 
there appears to be a sudden jump in RMSE after the forecasting horizon h = 8 in most 
variables, we may conclude that the spread provides reasonable forecasts for up to eight 
quarters ahead. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that TIC is fairly close to zero 
for y, pd, pgfc, and inv, prior to h = 8. Importantly, RMSFE is consistently less than unity for 
y, pd, pgfc, and inv, indicating that models with the spread consistently outperform those 
without. In short, our findings are similar to Luo (2008, p.25), who conclude that “the out-of-
sample analysis indicates that the yield spread is an important device in predicting the output 
growth for most industries and total GDP. This is particularly true when the growth rates are 
over longer horizons such as 4 or 8 quarters”.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
                                                 
11
 Following Hamilton and Kim (2002), Poke and Wells (2009) decompose the spread into the effect of 
expected future changes in short rates (or the rational term spread) and the effect of the time-varying term 




We set out to examine the extent to which the spread between long-term and short-term 
interest rates can predict economic activity in Australia for the period spanning from 1969 to 
2014. Through this study, we find that firstly, the spread is capable of predicting cumulative 
and marginal changes for up to four years and six quarters, respectively. Secondly, the spread 
proves to be most useful for predicting changes in interest-sensitive components of GNP, 
including private dwellings, private gross fixed capital formation, and inventories. 
Importantly, we find evidence rejecting the positive consumption-spread nexus hypothesized 
in the CCAPM model. Thirdly, there appears to be a structural break in the forecasting 
relationship around 1990, coinciding with the implementation of an inflation target by the 
RBA. Specifically, we find that positive association between spread and growth has become 
more robust during the post-IT regime era. This is at odds with the view that inflation target 
should have weakened the predictive power of the spread. Finally, the out-of-sample forecast 
analysis shows that models containing the spread consistently report less-than-unity RMSE 
and RMSFE statistics and close to zero TIC statistic for growth in output, private dwellings, 
private gross fixed capital formation, and inventories. These results indicate that the spread 
contains predictive power over and above the univariate autoregressive models for up to eight 
quarters ahead. In short, we conclude that the spread has served as a simple predictor for 
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Description  Mean Max. Min. Standard  
deviation 
Source 
cr 1976–2014  
(M) 
Interest rate: overnight  
(%) 




Interest rate: 3-month government bills  
(%) 




Interest rate: 2-year government bonds  
(%) 




Interest rate: 10-year government bonds  
(%)  




Yield spread: b10yr – b3mth  
(%) 
0.079 4.107 -10.150 1.744 Author’s own 
calculation 
rcr 1976–2014  
(M) 
Interest rate: real overnight  
(%) 




Real GDP  
(seasonally-adjusted, chain volume measures; $million) 
216115.60 397341.00 96497.00 89444.54 ABS cat. no. 5206.0  
Table 2 
cons 1959 -2014 
(Q) 
Final consumption: household  
(seasonally-adjusted, chain volume measures; $million) 
119041.90 202781.00 50008.00 42433.54 ABS cat. no. 5206.0  
Table 2 
gs 1959 -2014 
(Q) 
Final consumption: general government  
(seasonally-adjusted, chain volume measures; $million) 
14193.57 27403.00 6503.00 6398.96 ABS cat. no. 5206.0  
Table 2 
pd 1959 -2014 
(Q) 
Gross fixed capital formation: total private dwellings 
(seasonally-adjusted, chain volume measures; $million) 
12108.38 19550.00 5288.00 4482.44 ABS cat. no. 5206.0  
Table 2 
gfc 1959 -2014 
(Q) 
Gross fixed capital formation: total private  
(seasonally-adjusted, chain volume measures; $million) 




Total inventories  
(seasonally-adjusted, chain volume measures; $million) 
114788.20 152164.00 79626.00 26037.24 ABS cat. no. 5676.0 
inf 1976–2014  
(M) 
Inflation rate  
(%) 










Money: monetary base 
($ billion) 




Money: broad money 
($ billion) 









t h t j
j
t j t hy s y u  

       
Cumulative Change Marginal Change 









 0.066 1.767 
 
(0.607) (0.070) 
   
(0.419) (0.096) 








 0.094 1.732 
 
(0.488) (0.092) 
   
(0.367) (0.086) 








 0.082 1.746 
 
(0.411) (0.079) 
   
(0.343) (0.113) 




 0.066 1.767 7 3.613
*
 0.237 0.056 1.776 
 
(0.419) (0.096) 
   
(0.279) (0.184) 




 0.109 1.500 8 3.564
*
 0.213 0.038 1.796 
 
(0.399) (0.077) 
   
(0.224) (0.149) 




 0.139 1.325 9 3.432
*
 0.145 0.016 1.815 
 
(0.337) (0.065) 
   
(0.256) (0.164) 




 0.133 1.235 10 3.438
*
 0.082 0.002 1.830 
 
(0.283) (0.072) 
   
(0.278) (0.162) 




 0.145 1.132 11 3.327
*
 0.095 -0.007 1.841 
 
(0.268) (0.099) 
   
(0.271) (0.101) 




 0.155 0.832 12 3.052
*
 0.087 -0.003 1.843 
 
(0.169) (0.062) 
   
(0.244) (0.082) 




 0.199 0.676 13 3.003
*
 0.098 0.006 1.826 
 
(0.133) (0.072) 
   
(0.205) (0.086) 
  20 3.257
*
 0.196 0.297 0.533 14 2.869
*
 0.087 0.001 1.832 
 
(0.160) (0.135) 
   
(0.329) (0.091) 
  NOTE: a. In parentheses are Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors corrected with twelve lags. b. 
*
 denotes statistically significant at the 5 per cent level in two-tailed tests. c. 
2R  and SEE refer to the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom and the regression 
standard error, respectively. d. Row h in the Cumulative Change Panel is based on estimation for t = 1969:Q3 
through 2014:Q4 – h. Meanwhile, row h in the Marginal Change Panel is based on estimation for t = 1969:Q3 + 
h through 2014:Q4 – h, with k = 4. e. All estimation results are based on models including lagged output growth 









t h t j
j
t j t hx s x u  

       
 
y cons pd pgfc inv gs 
h 1  2R  SEE 1  2R  SEE 1  2R  SEE 1  2R  SEE 1  2R  SEE 1  2R  SEE 
2 0.305
*
 0.039 2.568 -0.203 0.111 2.118 2.959
*
 0.210 13.931 1.898
*
 0.161 9.915 0.604
*

















 0.066 1.767 -0.069 -0.001 1.605 2.584
*
 0.219 10.920 1.692
*
 0.167 8.528 0.302
*

















 0.139 1.325 0.036 -0.022 1.346 1.460
*
 0.209 8.857 1.634
*
 0.189 6.399 0.480
*

















 0.145 1.132 0.067 0.006 1.160 0.832 0.233 7.086 1.371
*
 0.201 5.330 0.615
*

















 0.155 0.832 0.098 0.037 0.846 0.360 0.311 4.323 0.986
*
 0.198 3.886 0.761
*

















 0.199 0.676 0.111
*
 0.048 0.678 0.480
*
 0.141 4.146 0.829
*
 0.220 3.029 0.738
*















NOTE: a. In parentheses are Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors corrected with twelve lags. b. 
*
 denotes statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level in two-tailed tests. c. 2R  and SEE refer to the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom and the regression standard error, 
respectively. d. Row h is based on estimation for t = 1969q3 through 2014q4 – h. e. All estimation results are based on models including a constant and lagged output growth 













t h t t j t j t
j
hy s m y u   

       
 
y cr rcr b2 
h 1   2   2R   SEE 1   2   2R   SEE 1   2   2R   SEE 1   2   2R   SEE 
2 0.305
*
 n.a 0.039 2.568 0.296
*




 0.045 2.318 0.425 -0.179 0.013 1.490 
 
(0.092) 






  4 0.303
*
 n.a 0.066 1.767 0.349
*
 -0.026 0.082 1.727 0.367
*
 0.064 0.084 1.725 0.433 -0.375 0.073 1.044 
 
(0.096) 






  6 0.312
*
 n.a 0.139 1.325 0.363
*




 0.169 1.337 0.435
*
 -0.331 0.114 0.841 
 
(0.065) 






  8 0.261
*
 n.a 0.145 1.132 0.350
*
 -0.021 0.218 1.107 0.363
*
 0.042 0.219 1.106 0.549 -0.307 0.275 0.687 
 
(0.099) 






  12 0.202
*
 n.a 0.155 0.832 0.248
*
 -0.029 0.205 0.847 0.253
*




 0.387 0.510 
 
(0.062) 






  16 0.185
*
 n.a 0.199 0.676 0.237 0.094
*
 0.244 0.670 0.237 0.094
*













  NOTE: a. In parentheses are Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The y, cr and rcr panels are corrected with twelve lags, 
while the b2 panel are corrected with three lags due to limited observations. b. 
*
 denotes statistically significant at the 5 per cent level in two-tailed tests. c. 2R  and SEE refer 
to the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom and the regression standard error, respectively. d. With the exception of the b2 panel, row h is based on 
estimation for t = 1969q3 through 2014q4 – h. For the b2 panel, row h is based on estimation for t = 1995q2 through 2014q4 – h. e. All estimation results are based on models 












t h t t j t j t
j
hy s m y u   

       
 
y mb m1 bm 
h 1   2   2R   SEE 1   2   2R   SEE 1   2   2R   SEE 1   2   2R   SEE 
2 0.305
*
 n.a 0.039 2.568 0.333
*








 0.062 2.296 
 
(0.092) 






  4 0.303
*
 n.a 0.066 1.767 0.367
*








 0.116 1.695 
 
(0.096) 






  6 0.312
*
 n.a 0.139 1.325 0.359
*
 0.124 0.151 1.348 0.340
*
 11.735 0.185 1.321 0.427
*
 20.130 0.191 1.315 
 
(0.065) 






  8 0.261
*
 n.a 0.145 1.132 0.335
*
 0.798 0.197 1.117 0.325
*
 7.379 0.215 1.105 0.404
*
 14.661 0.238 1.094 
 
(0.099) 






  12 0.202
*
 n.a 0.155 0.832 0.245
*
 0.373 0.196 0.847 0.244
*
 1.057 0.196 0.846 0.244
*
 -2.958 0.204 0.848 
 
(0.062) 






  16 0.185
*
 n.a 0.199 0.676 0.211 0.182 0.218 0.677 0.213
*




 0.241 0.672 
 
(0.072) 






  NOTE: a. In parentheses are Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are corrected with twelve lags. b. 
*
 denotes statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level in two-tailed tests. c. 2R  and SEE refer to the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom and the regression standard error, 
respectively. d. With the exception of the b2 panel, row h is based on estimation for t = 1969q3 through 2014q4 – h. e. All estimation results are based on models including a 
















NOTE: a. The spread refers to the difference between the 10-year government bond rate and the 3-month 
government bill rate. b. The shaded region represents a recession, defined as at least two periods of consecutive 
negative real GDP growth rate. In total, there are six recessions, and in chronological order, occurred in 









t h t j t j h
j
ty s y u  

       
 
1969q3-2014q4 Pre-IT Regime Post-IT Regime 
h 1   2R   SEE 1   2R  SEE 1  2R  SEE 
2 0.305
*
 0.039 2.568 0.342
*
 0.039 3.276 0.454
*







  4 0.303
*
 0.066 1.767 0.284 0.060 2.172 0.484
*







  6 0.312
*
 0.065 1.325 0.284 0.131 1.605 0.467
*







  8 0.261
*
 0.145 1.132 0.185 0.106 1.396 0.471
*







  12 0.202
*
 0.155 0.832 0.102 0.056 1.019 0.403
*







  16 0.185
*
 0.199 0.676 0.093 0.086 0.810 0.343
*







  NOTE: a. In parentheses are Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors are corrected with three lags due to data limitation. b. 
*
 denotes statistically significant at the 5 per cent 
level in two-tailed tests. c. 2R  and SEE refer to the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom 
and the regression standard error, respectively. d. Row h in the pre-IT and post-IT regime panels is based on 
estimation for t = 1969q3 through 1989q4 – h and t = 1990q1 through 2014q4 – h, respectively. All estimation 
results are based on models including a constant and lagged output growth rates (estimates not reported, for the 





Table 7. Pseudo out-of-sample performance of the yield spread, by selected forecasting 
evaluating statistics    
 y cons pd pgfc inv gs 
h = 2       
RMSE 0.223 2.341 0.443 0.521 0.222 4.532 
TIC 0.231 0.980 0.121 0.341 0.064 0.776 
RMSFE 0.852 1.290 0.674 0.801 0.321 1.373 
h = 4       
RMSE 0.312 2.456 0.356 0.531 0.281 3.431 
TIC 0.301 0.921 0.081 0.450 0.062 0.791 
RMSFE 0.760 1.892 0.741 0.765 0.321 1.331 
h = 6       
RMSE 0.281 3.431 0.445 0.483 0.243 5.432 
TIC 0.256 0.890 0.123 0.281 0.051 0.816 
RMSFE 0.761 1.651 0.889 0.524 0.401 1.345 
h = 8       
RMSE 0.299 2.998 0.389 0.473 0.554 6.082 
TIC 0.163 0.991 0.157 0.445 0.069 0.871 
RMSFE 0.782 1.320 1.002 0.781 0.341 1.983 
h =12       
RMSE 0.412 3.414 0.481 0.556 0.514 5.865 
TIC 0.282 0.801 0.371 0.541 0.142 0.990 
RMSFE 0.693 1.114 0.997 0.888 0.499 1.887 
h = 16       
RMSE 0.446 4.012 0.515 0.671 0.764 6.874 
TIC 0.203 0.804 0.661 0.522 0.113 0.801 
RMSFE 0.701 1.342 1.124 0.934 0.501 1.553 
NOTE: a. RMSE, TIC, and RMSFE denote, respectively, the root mean squared error, the Theil inequality 
coefficient, and the relative mean squared forecast error. b. The initialization period is 1996q1 through 2006q4.  
 
 
  
 
